Nominative signature provides an interesting share of power between a nominator and a nominee in which a nominative signature, generated jointly by the nominator and the nominee, can only be verified with the aid of the nominee. In this paper, we propose a new construction of nominative signature which has a higher network efficiency than the existing one (Liu et al., 2007) . In addition, our scheme is the first one supporting nominee-only conversion. We also enhance the security model of nominative signature for capturing this new property.
INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of undeniable signature (Chaum and van Antwerpen, 1990; Chaum, 1990; Chaum and van Antwerpen, 1992) , there have been many other non-self-authenticating notions introduced. One of them is Nominative Signature (NS) (Kim et al., 1996; Huang and Wang, 2004; Susilo and Mu, 2005; Guo et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2007 ). An NS scheme allows a nominator A and a nominee B to jointly generate a signature σ on a message m such that the validity of σ can only be verified by B. In addition, only B can convince a (third-party) verifier C the validity of σ.
Although the notion of NS has been introduced for over a decade (Kim et al., 1996) , it was not until recently that the notion has finally been formalized (Liu et al., 2007) . In the past, besides lacking a formal definition, the application of NS has also been questioned. In (Liu et al., 2007) , it is shown that NS is a very useful tool for constructing user certification systems, which concern about letting a user prove the validity of his own birth certificate, driving licence and academic transcripts, issued by authorities. In such a system, the user (nominee) B does not want a verifier three-move Witness Indistinguishable protocol. The key generation can be completed in just two message flows between the nominator and the nominee, and therefore, has a higher network efficiency than the current one (Liu et al., 2007) . We also extend the security model for capturing nominee-only conversion.
Paper Organization. We define convertible NS and propose an enhanced security model in Sec. 2. We then propose a new NS construction in Sec. 3. The security analysis is given in Sec. 4. The paper is concluded in Sec. 5.
DEFINITIONS AND SECURITY MODELS
We extend the definition of NS from (Liu et al., 2007) to a convertible NS. Specifically, in addition to the properties captured in the definition of (Liu et al., 2007) , we also allow the nominee, but nobody else, to convert an NS to a standard signature which can be self-authenticated. A nominative signature (NS) consists of five PPT (probabilistic polynomial-time) algorithms (SystemSetup, KeyGen, Ver nominee , Convert, Ver public ) and three protocols (SigGen, Confirmation, Disavowal). On input a security parameter 1 k , where k ∈ N, SystemSetup is first invoked for generating a list of system parameters denoted by param. Then, (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(param) is executed for each entity in the system. We use A and B to denote the nominator and the nominee, respectively. Let (pk A , sk A ) be A's key pair and (pk B , sk B ) be B's. To generate an NS σ on some message m ∈ {0, 1} * , A and B carry out the SigGen protocol. Signature Space: This is determined by pk A and pk B . We emphasize that the signature space has to be explicitly specified in each actual NS scheme specification. The validity of σ can be determined by B using Ver nominee on input (m, σ, pk A , sk B ). To convince a third party C on the validity/invalidity of σ, B as prover and C as verifier carry out a Confirmation or Disavowal protocol:
Confirmation/Disavowal Protocol: B sets µ to 1 if valid ← Ver nominee (m, σ, pk A , sk B ); otherwise, µ is set to 0. If µ = 1, Confirmation protocol is carried out; otherwise, Disavowal protocol is carried out. At the end, C outputs either accept or reject while B has no output.
To convert σ to a standard signature σ pub , B runs Convert(m, σ, pk A , sk B ). After the conversion, the validity of σ pub can be verified by running Ver public (m, σ pub , pk A , pk B ). Correctness. If all the algorithms mentioned above are executed accordingly, the NS scheme should satisfy the following requirements. (1) valid ← Ver nominee (m, σ, pk A , sk B ); (2) C outputs accept at the end of the Confirmation protocol; and (3) valid ← Ver public (m, σ pub , pk A , pk B ).
On the security of NS, (Liu et al., 2007) defines (1) unforgeability, (2) invisibility, (3) security against impersonation and (4) non-repudiation. We will adopt these definitions. Besides, we also define an additional security model for capturing the notion of (5) nominee-only conversion.
Before elaborating the corresponding games, we first describe some oracles that are to be provided to adversaries:
• CreateUser: On input an identity I, it generates a key pair (pk I , sk I ) using KeyGen and returns pk I .
• Corrupt: On input a public key pk, if pk is generated by CreateUser or in {pk A , pk B }, the corresponding private key is returned; otherwise, ⊥ is returned. pk is said to be corrupted.
On input a message m, two distinct public keys, pk 1 (the nominator) and pk 2 (the nominee), and one parameter called role ∈ {nil, nominator, nominee},
-if role = nil, S simulates SigGen and returns (σ,trans σ ) where σ is a valid nominative signature (i.e. valid ← Ver nominee (m, σ, pk 1 , sk 2 ) where sk 2 is the corresponding private key of pk 2 ) and trans σ is the transcript of the execution of SigGen.
-if role = nominator, S (as nominee with public key pk 2 ) simulates a run of SigGen with the adversary (which acts as the nominator with pk 1 ); -if role = nominee, S (as nominator with pk 1 ) simulates a run of SigGen with the adversary (which acts as the nominee with pk 2 ).
• Confirmation/disavowal: On input a message m, a nominative signature σ and two public keys pk 1 (nominator), pk 2 (nominee), let sk 2 be the corresponding private key of pk 2 , the oracle responds based on whether a passive attack or an active/concurrent attack is mounted.
-Passive attack: If Ver nominee (m, σ, pk 1 , sk 2 ) outputs valid, the oracle returns µ = 1 and a transcript of the Confirmation protocol. Otherwise, µ = 0 and a transcript of the Disavowal protocol are returned.
-Active/concurrent attack: the oracle checks if σ is valid as in the passive attack. If so, the oracle returns µ = 1 and executes the Confirmation protocol with the adversary (acting as a verifier). Otherwise, the oracle returns µ = 0 and executes the Disavowal protocol with the adversary. The difference between active and concurrent attack is that the adversary interacts serially with the oracle in the active attack while it interacts with different instances of the oracle concurrently in the concurrent attack.
such that valid ← Ver nominee (m, σ, pk 1 , sk 2 ), the oracle returns σ pub such that valid ← Ver public (m, σ pub , pk 1 , pk 2 ). Space on page 2). F 's advantage is defined to be the probability that F wins.
Unforgeability
Definition 1 (Liu et al., 2007) 
Invisibility

Security Against Impersonation
Game Impersonation: Let I be an impersonator.
The initialization phase is the same as that of Game Unforgeability. The two other phases are as follows.
• (Preparation Phase) I may query any of the oracles. I prepares (m * , σ * , µ) where m * is some message, σ * is in the signature space with respect to pk A and pk B and µ is a bit.
• ( I wins if the simulator outputs accept at the Impersonation Phase while I has never corrupted sk B in the game. I 's advantage is defined to be the probability that I wins.
Definition 3 (Liu et al., 2007) An NS scheme is secure against impersonation if no PPT impersonator
I has a non-negligible advantage in Game Impersonation.
Non-repudiation
Game Non-repudiation: Let B be a cheating nominee which can query any of the oracles. The initialization phase is the same as that of Game Unforgeability. The two other phases are: (1) B wins the game if the simulator outputs accept in the repudiation phase. B 's advantage is defined to be the probability that B wins.
Definition 4 (Liu et al., 2007) We now propose an additional security requirement. This one is for convertible NS.
Nominee-only Conversion
This security notion requires that it should be infeasible for anyone but the nominee to convert a valid nominative signature to a publicly-verifiable one. We consider the following game.
Game Nominee-only Conversion: The initialization phase is the same as that of Game Unforgeability. An adversary C can query any of the oracles. At the end of the game, C outputs (m * , σ * ,σ pub ). 
OUR CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we propose a new construction, which has a higher network efficiency than the one in (Liu et al., 2007) during signature generation and also supports nominee-only conversion.
Preliminaries
Ring Signature. Our construction makes use of a special structure of the ring signature scheme due to (Rivest et al., 2001 ) (RST scheme). In the RST scheme, it is assumed that each ring member has a one-way trapdoor permutation f and its inverse f −1 (i.e. the trapdoor). There is a random "glue" value z in each RST ring signature and the scheme requires a block cipher SE :
be the decryption algorithm of the block cipher.
Verifiable Decryption. A verifiable decryption (VD) scheme for a relation ℜ (Camenisch and Shoup, 2003) has an encryption/decryption algorithm pair (Enc, Dec) associated with a verification protocol suite which allows a prover who possesses the secret key of a public key pk to convince a verifier that given δ and ciphertext ψ encrypted under pk, ψ is the encryption of ω where (ω, δ) ∈ ℜ. In other words, the prover is the decryptor who holds the secret key sk.
In our NS scheme, we adopt the proofing protocols for VD of discrete logarithm due to (Camenisch and Shoup, 2003) to implement the Confirmation/Disavowal protocols. The protocols of (Camenisch and Shoup, 2003) are special honest verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK). In our NS scheme, however, we need concurrent zero-knowledge (CZK) protocols for security proofs. Therefore, we apply the standard transformations (Goldreich and Kahan, 1996; Cramer et al., 2000; Damgård, 2000; Gennaro, 2004) and convert them to CZK variants in the common reference string (CRS) model.
Our Scheme
SystemSetup: It generates a cyclic group G of k-bit prime order p and a random generator g. Assume that each element of G can be encoded distinctly into a k-bit binary string. Let H : SE, G, p, g, H) . 
is in the signature space with respect to pk A and pk B if σ 1 is a valid ring signature on "message" K, σ 2 is properly formed with respect to the VD scheme, i.e., σ 2 can be properly decrypted to some message m, and σ 3 is a valid standard signature of B on "message" m σ 1 σ 2 (i.e. with respect to Ver B ). Note that if σ is in the signature space, it does not imply that σ is a valid NS. The validity can only be verified by B:
Ver nominee : On input (m, σ, pk A , sk B ) where σ = (σ ring , Enc B (r), σ standard ) is in the signature space, compute r = Dec B (Enc B (r)) and check if , pk A , sk B ) , B sets µ = 1; otherwise, sets µ = 0.
• If µ = 1, B proves to C that the decryption of Enc B (r) is a discrete log of R B using the corresponding VD protocol.
• If µ = 0, B proves to C that the decryption of Enc B (r) is NOT a discrete log of R B using the corresponding VD protocol.
, B outputs a standard signature σ pub = (σ, r).
Verify: On input (m, σ pub , pk A , pk B ), check if all of the followings are valid:
Discussion. In the SigGen protocol, there are only two message flows between A and B. When compared with (Liu et al., 2007) , our construction does not need a three-move Witness Indistinguishable protocol, and therefore has a higher network efficiency. It remains an open problem if a non-interactive SigGen protocol can be built, namely, there is only one message flow between A and B. (Goldwasser et al., 1988) (Goldwasser et al., 1988) .
SECURITY ANALYSIS Lemma 1 (Cheating Nominee) Let k ∈ N be a security parameter. If a (t, ε, Q)-nominee can forge a valid NS with probability at least ε after running at most time t and making at most Q queries, there exists a (t ′ , ε ′ )-adversary which can invert a trapdoor one-way permutation with probability at least
This theorem follows directly from Lemma 1 and 2. Proofs of the lemmas are in Appendix A. 
Theorem 3 (Nominee-only Conversion) The convertible NS scheme proposed satisfies nominee-only conversion (Def. 5) if there exists trapdoor one-way permutations and existentially unforgeable signature schemes against chosen message attacks (Goldwasser et al., 1988).
All proofs above are in Appendix A.
Both confirmation and disavowal protocols in this scheme are zero-knowledge. Therefore, the scheme already satisfies the requirements of security against impersonation (Def. 2.3). In addition, by using the technique of Theorem 2, it can be shown that compromising the security against impersonation of this scheme reduces to compromising the underlying zero-knowledge confirmation/disavowal protocols of VD of discrete logarithm in (Camenisch and Shoup, 2003) . We skip the details but readers can readily derive the reduction from the proving technique of Theorem 2.
The scheme also satisfies the requirement that nominee cannot repudiate. This follows directly the soundness property of the underlying VD of discrete logarithm protocol (Camenisch and Shoup, 2003) .
CONCLUSION
We proposed a convertible NS scheme which does not require to run a three-move Witness Indistinguishable protocol for signature generation and only two message flows are required to complete the generation. This gives our construction an advantage in network efficiency over the one in (Liu et al., 2007) . We also enhanced the security model of (Liu et al., 2007) for capturing nominee-only conversion. It remains an open problem to construct an NS with a noninteractive signature generation process.
A APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proo f . If a (t, ε, Q)-forger F after obtaining
Game Unforgeability with at least probability ε by producing a valid nominative signature σ * = (σ ring * , Enc B (r * ), σ standard * ) on some message m * after running at most time t and making at most Q queries (all kinds of oracle queries which include game specific oracles and random oracles), we construct a (t ′ , ε ′ )-algorithm S which inverts a trapdoor one-way permutationf : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k on some random inputŷ ∈ R {0, 1} k with at least probability ε ′ after running at most time t ′ . We will derive the values of ε ′ and t ′ in this proof. Let the ring signature σ ring * on "message" K * be (z * pk 1 = pk A in Game Unforgeability), S is unable to follow the protocol to compute an inversion off .
But thanks to random oracle, S can do the evaluation off and assign the appropriate SE/SE −1 evaluations with a randomly generated 'glue' value z ∈ R {0, 1} k . This simulation is computationally indistinguishable from a real simulation due to the idealness of random oracles.
• Case (2): If role = nominator, S simulates an execution of SigGen protocol with F . S acts as the nominee. Similar to Case (1), S can simply follow the exact execution of SigGen protocol even if the nominee is A. This is because when A is the nominee, A does not require to invertf .
• Case ( and z, S does not need to invertf .
For Confirmation/disavowal and OracleConvert queries, since S has all parties' private key component Dec, S can always carry out the confirmation/disavowal protocols and perform the standard signature conversion.
Reduction:
We follow the argument of the "gap" technique used in the soundness proof of the ring signature of (Rivest et al., 2001) . The "gap" technique is based on an observation that the valid ring signature σ ring * forged by F must have a gap somewhere between two cyclically consecutive occurrences of SE, and F must be forced to fill in this gap by computing the inverse of the corresponding trapdoor oneway permutation. Since F has to query S for the results of SE and SE −1 evaluations, S can make use of the queries of the two SE/SE −1 evaluations, which form the gap, to assign the desiredŷ. If F makes at most Q queries, the probability that S guesses correctly the two SE/SE −1 queries is at least Q −2 . In σ ring * , there are only two possible gaps. One is at y 2 = f B (R * B ) and the other one at y 1 =f (R * A ). If the gap is at y 2 , then with at most 2 −k probability that f −1 B (y 2 ) is of the form g r * where r * ∈ R Z p since y 2 is uniformly distributed over {0, 1} k . Therefore, with probability (1 − 2 −k ), the gap is at y 1 . S 's goal is to set y 1 toŷ. As described above, S randomly picks two SE/SE −1 queries as the guess of the two SE/SE −1 queries for forming the gap. Once F outputs σ ring * = (z * , R * A , R * B ), S outputs R * A as the result off −1 (ŷ).
Hence if the advantage of F in Game Unforgeability is ε, the probability that S inverts the trapdoor one-way permutation is at least Q −2 (1 − 2 −k )ε. If each random oracle query takes at most time t q to finish, the simulation time of the game for F is at most t + Qt q + c where c denotes some constant time for system setup and key generation.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proo f . If a (t, ε, Q)-forger F after obtaining via oracle Corrupt the nominator A's private key sk A = ( f
−1
A , Sig A , Enc A ) and is able to win Game Unforgeability with probability at least ε by producing a valid nominative signature σ * = (σ ring * , Enc B (r * ), σ standard * ) on some message m * after running at most time t and making at most Q queries, where σ standard * is a standard signature of nominee B on "message" m * σ ring * Enc B (r * ), we construct a (t ′ , ε ′ )-algorithm S to forge a signature with respect to a standard signature scheme (Sig * ,Ver * ) with probability at least ε ′ , in the model of existential forgery against chosen message attacks (Goldwasser et al., 1988) after running at most time t ′ . By forging a standard signature, S is given a problem instance Ver * but not Sig * and S is to output a pair (m,σ) such that Ver * (m,σ) = 1 after adaptively querying a signing oracle. The restriction is thatm has never been queried to the signing oracle.
In the simulation of Game Unforgeability, S sets the public key of nominee B to pk B = ( f B ,Ver * , Enc B ) and private key to sk B = ( f −1 B , ⊥, Dec B ). The simulation is similar to that in the proof of Lemma 1 with the exception that for each query of B's standard signature, the query will be forwarded to the signing oracle of Sig * by S and the answer is relayed back.
First, we show that with probability at most 2 −k Q, the ring signature σ ring * in σ * is an output of oracle SignTranscript. As restricted by Game Unforgeability, (m * , pk A , pk B , role) should have never been queried to oracle SignTranscript. Hence if oracle SignTranscript has output a nominative signature which contains the ring signature σ ring * , it should be a valid ring signature for some message, sayK, with respect to ring members identified by pk 1 and pk 2 . Since S simulates all the hash functions and SE/SE −1 evaluations by picking returning values uniformly at random from the corresponding spaces, the chance that at least there is one valid output of SignTranscript that contains σ ring * is at most 2 −k Q.
Hence when F outputs a forgery, σ standard * must be a forgery with respect to (Sig * ,Ver * ) on messagẽ m = m * σ ring * Enc B (r) * with exceptional probability of at most 2 −k Q. If the advantage of F in Game Unforgeability is ε, the probability that S existentially forges a signature with respect to (Sig * ,Ver * ) is at least ε ′ = (1 − 2 −k Q)ε. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, the running time of S is at most t ′ = t + Qt q + c. 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Proo f . By Theorem 1, the scheme is unforgeable with respect to Def. 1 if there exist trapdoor one-way permutation and standard signature scheme which is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks. In Game Nominee-only Conversion, adversary C can corrupt A's private key but not B's private key. Hence if C wins and outputs a triple (m * , σ * ,σ pub ) such that valid ← Ver nominee (m * , σ * , pk A , sk B ) and valid ← Ver public (m * ,σ pub , pk A , pk B ), σ * must be generated by the game simulator via a SignTranscript query rather than by C with negligible exceptional probability. The game simulation is the same as that in the proof of Theorem 2.
We now show that if there exists a (t, ε, Q)-adversary C in Game Nominee-Only conversion, then there exists a (t ′ , ε ′ )-distinguisher D Enc which has advantage at least ε ′ = ε to launch an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack to the underlying encryption scheme by running at most time t ′ = t + Qt q + c where t q is the maximum time for simulating one oracle query and c denotes some constant time for system setup and key generation. 
